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Introduction
The treatment by the Japanese of British POWs and civilian internees
during the Second World War still causes strains in Anglo-Japanese
relations, and the war memory has kept the British public at a
6psychological distance7from Japan, as a Japanese spokesman acknowl-
edged in an article of May 1998.） On the other hand, little concern had
been paid in Japan to the issue of the6Western, white7Allied prisoners
until the end of the 1980s.6Anglo-Japanese reconciliation7was not
always well-accepted subject and, indeed, even in the 1990s, a relative lack
of interest was shown in the subject, compared to other related historical
issues. I will discuss the Japanese treatment of POWs, and then look at
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development and frustration of Anglo-Japanese postwar reconciliation.
1. Japan and European POWs
In the late nineteenth century, Japan genuinely concerned was to enter
into the magic circle of6civilized nations7when, though of very different
origins and attitudes, she first came into close contact with the
international community of European origin. Displaying her6civilization7,
or her6cultural superiority7to other Asian countries, especially to the
Chinese Empire, Japan signed the Red Cross Treaty in 1887 and then
announced at the commencement of the war with China in 1894-95 that
Japan would honor the internationally accepted laws of war.	） The
Japanese army treated prisoners of war quite humanely in the 1904-05 war
with the Russian Empire.
） In the war with the German Empire,
1914-1918, the Japanese again treated POWs well.
During the Asian Pacific War of 1941-45, however, the Japanese army
behaved in a quite different way, which was not anticipated by those
British officers who had known it very well in the 1920s and 1930s.） The
army authority sent an official note to the expeditionary forces in
December 1941 stating that:6We hope the POWs captured in the present
war will be reasonably treated applying international laws accordingly7.）
Yet, when H.D.E. Sitwell, a British commander, tried in 1942 to put into his
surrender terms a clause that POWs would be treated in Java according to
the Geneva Convention in Java 1942, a Japanese staff officer6prickly7
informed him that6Japan, the same as Great Britain, only stuck to the
Geneva Convention when it suited her.7）
Ironically, specifically for the period of the Russo-Japanese war, the
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Japanese behaviors in the theatre of war had had an element of calculation
in with the Western observersR- specifically her alliance, BritainRs
applauds and Britain encouraged the rest of the world to recognize that
Japan, as a late-coming ScivilizedR nation, deserved to be admitted to the
select group of6great powers7.） Throughout the Second World War, the
Japanese mistreated British POWs in part to demonstrate their6cultural
superiority7and as a way of paying back former sensitivities to6foreign
slights7.） For the captors who had become obsessed by the notion of an
honorable death in the 1930s, to die honorably in battle was also a way of
proving cultural superiority to the West. At the same time, in this6war
over colonies7with the British, in which the Japanese always inflamed the
passions which racial prejudice could stir up, their barbarous treatment of
British nationals did, especially in the early stages of the war, enable them
to bolster pride in Japanʼs self-proclaimed role as6defender of
Asiatics.7）
In January 1944, Anthony Eden stated in the House of Common that
6the Japanese have violated, not only the principles of International Law,
but the canons of decent and civilized conduct.710） Until the end of the
war, of the 50,016 British POWs captured by the Japanese, 12,433 died of
maltreatment, disease, starvation and Allied bombing. Since they were
released in 1945, the photographs and the details of the POWs camps of the
Japanese had made the British public extremely shocked. Sir George
Sansom, British representative on The Far Eastern Advisory Commission
told Shidehara Kijûrôr, then Prime Minister, a few months after the end of
the war that6the Japanese army was seriously damaged by the atrocities
they committed rather than by the defeat itself.711）
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During postwar courts, Western intellectuals with skepticism about
Euro-centric ideas of6civilization7or6culture7suspected that Japanʼs
culture was, for instance, one of6shame7rather than6guilt7and that no
one should punish a6man for living according to his own culture.7Paolo
Marella, apostolic delegate of the Holy See to Japan, spoke for the war
criminals at the trial in Tokyo. His memorandum to the tribunal stated:6in
order to arrive at an impartial judgement it is necessary to add that the
Japanese do not have the ideas on the treatment of prisoners that a long
period of Christian culture has given us.712） The International Committee
of the Red Cross similarly argued that the mistreatment of POWs was
6doubtless due chiefly to the survival of certain ancestral ideas, according
to which the status of prisoners of war is degrading.713） Bert Röling,
Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal judge and first IPRA Secretariat, later
commented with respect to the racial aspects of prisonersRmistreatment,
for example, that6the truth was…that it was very difficult for a tall, white
man to be under the orders of the small, dark Japanese. They resented that
more than anything else: to be under those fellows who in former days, as
Asians, were always treated as second class people.714）
What many Japanese had come to feel were their ordeals tended to take
second place to the6unjust tragedies7suffered by former Japanese
military men as a result of6unjust7or6mistaken7decisions imposed by
the war victors during postwar trials. The Japanese cultural apologists
suspected that, as far as the mistreatment of the European POWs was
concerned, some Japanese,6for living according to his own culture7, might
have been included in those who were punished by the Western victors.
Yet, Japanʼs war with the Western Allies was not a clash of cultures and
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spiritual extremism, which made it difficult for the Japanese to surrender,
only emerged in the modern age and was not based on ancestral traditions
and customs. The 1930s saw an obsession with honorable death on the
battlefield which an obvious correlation with a rise in anti-Western
sentiment. It was no less than an emergence of a new style nationalism,
rather than a revival of ancestral traditions or culture, and was firmly tied
up to a desire to exclude the West. This kind of cultural nationalism
reemerged in the form of Japanese resentment against the Western
victorsRpunishment and their sympathetic feelings for the minor war
criminals. It more or less prevented postwar Japanese from recognizing
their6sufferings7whilst acknowledging the6facts7about their ordeals.
When the peace treaty went into effect in 1952, the Japanese
government, was besieged by the large numbers of petitions for prompt
release of imprisoned Japanese war criminals, and decided to send a special
delegate to the Western Allies to seek amnesty for these prisoners. In
Britain, in the Netherlands, and also in Australia, Tsuchida Yutaka, the
delegate, met with was either strong hesitation or prompt refusal. On
returning to his country, Tsuchida made a report on the Western AlliesR
reactions:
The attitude taken by the British was, in summary, quite similar to
that taken by the Americans, but was ever more sensitive to
predictable reactions of her public opinion and parliament. It is clear
that the British government intends to handle this subject very
carefully because they believe that, given the circumstances that her
ordinary nationals donʼt have good feelings towards Japan, it is quite
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possible that a lenient resolution [for the Japanese war criminals
issue] could bring the government itself into a very tight corner.15）
Wakimura Yoshitarô, a former President of the Japan Academy and
dean of Japanese economists, reflected later that he had been6asked by
the embassy to try a negotiation with the British and ask them not to
advertise so much the issue of the mistreatment of the POWs.716） He thus
tried to convince his British counterparts by arguing that6Japanese
soldiers could not refuse any of their superiorsRcommands because they
were ordered to observe their superiorsRcommands as if they were the
Emperorʼs commands, no matter what:7
Now their argument was that, soldiers might not be held responsible
but, where officers caused the death of POWs without trial following
commands from their superiors, they were in the wrong because they
should know about the treaty on POWs. In other words, all officers,
including commanders and executors, are responsible for their acts. In
return, I asked what was his opinion about indiscriminate bombing and
atomic bombs, and he answered that in war, like love, every means to
an end is acceptable. However, POWs had surrendered and given up
fighting. He seemed unable to say that the Japanese army had not
acknowledged this point.
This kind of argument would often be repeated, especially when there
was a wish to focus on victimization by the Western Allies. Many Japanese
tended to feel that, if they had to confess to past wrong doings, they ought
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to demand reciprocal confessions from the other side.
2. Death of the Emperor and Impact of the British Tabloids
It was in the late 1980s when the nation again realized this issue was still
alive. There were dozens of critical statements in the foreign mass media
about the dying Emperor Hirohito. These included the British tabloid
newspapers, in the context of what took place during the war.17） As far as
these tabloid articles were concerned, this criticism was unexpected by the
Japanese public who had embraced a romantic myth of their own monarch:
Britain and Japan, although geographically far apart, were psychologically
close because of their various similarities, the most essential and
mysterious among these being the existence of constitutional monarchies
6with the longest historical traditions7in both countries.
What the tabloids refused to acknowledge was this image which the
Japanese public held of themselves. The postwar monarchy in Japan had
been encouraged by the US Occupation authorities to recast itself into the
same mould as the British monarchy.18） Publicizing Hirohitoʼs own
experiences in Britain as Crown Prince and his personal respect for the
British constitution served to create a postwar image of a6peace-loving,
constitution-observing emperor7whose wish for peace had earlier been
often hampered by the jingoists and the chauvinists who surrounded him.
The shared elements of constitutional monarchy were often used
domestically as a vehicle for spreading a postwar image of Emperor
Hirohito. The Japanese public was encouraged to believe that the
continuation of very ceremonial monarchy in their postwar democracy, as
in Britain, was an entirely natural process deriving from an ancient history.
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What the Emperorʼs trip to European countries disclosed was, however,
something which the Japanese public had often forgotten: their monarch
was, in the foreignersReyes, inescapably associated with war memories
and questions of6war responsibility.7The postwar image of the Emperor
became confused in Japan after his visit to Europe in 1971 and his
encounters with6ordinary7European citizens. It is possible to say that
subsequent debates by Japanese left-leaning intellectuals on the Emperorʼs
6war responsibility7and Hirohitoʼs own response in the mid- 1970s were
initially motivated by what happened during the visits to Europe in 1971
and to the US in 1975.
In 1988-1989, it seemed likely that the British tabloid comments on
Emperor Hirohito would have the same effect. In reality, the voices from
Europe had a rather different impact on the Japanese public. Many
Japanese had been embarrassed by the excesses of the Japanese mass
media which went on scattering, almost every minute, information about
Emperor Hirohitoʼs state of health. It is true, too, that critical voices from
Asian countries against this totalitarian-like phenomenon in the Japanese
media were making more Japanese think about Japanʼs past aggressions
and the oppression earlier inflicted upon the neighbors. Yet, for those who
had a historical consciousness that both Britain and Japan had been
6guilty7of their respective colonial rules over Asian nations, the British
tabloid comments, the most sensational among the foreign commentary of
the period to and after the Emperorʼs death, now seemed to rather blind to
their own6past7. To those Japanese who had embraced romantic ideas
about royal6similarity,7the tabloid articles was their first encountering
the6masses7of Britain at the very end of the Shôwa period. A Japanese
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journalist in London lamented that the statements made by The Sun and
The Daily Star were6too exaggerated and sensational to be translated
into the Japanese language.7The feelings among British ex-POWs and
their demonstrations irritated the Japanese whose image of6Igrisu
[=Britain]7had been simply made within a set of royal myths and The
Times articles.
3. Compensation and Reconciliation
Five weeks before the Emperorʼs death in 1989, in the House of
Commons, a motion for reparations payable for ex-POWs of the Japanese
was supported by more than 200 MPs. The motion stressed6that
[Anglo-Japanese] relations will not fully blossom until the wrongs done
during the Second World War to Allied prisoners are fully accepted by the
Japanese Government and due reparation made.719） In the following
years, through various House debates, the British government was often
urged to support the compensation claimants, and finally in 1994-98,
class-action lawsuits against the Japanese government were initiated by
non-governmental actors from the Netherlands, Britain, the US, Australia
and New Zealand. The claimants strongly appealed to their governments to
demand from Tokyo a sincere, heartfelt apology for the wrongs done
during the war.
As far as the compensation issue was concerned, the attitude taken by
the British government was similar to the Japanese who were reluctant to
pay further reparations to the war victims. The authorities continued to
state that the question of compensation had been legally settled by Articles
14 and 16 of the 1951 peace treaty. The British compensation claimants
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filed their 1995 suit for reparation against Japan on the basis that the
Japanese treatment of American, Australian and New Zealand prisoners of
war and civilian detainees had been extremely inhumane. 20） In the two
POW cases (the first brought by the Dutch in 1994, and the second by the
British and others in 1995) which were deliberated by the Tokyo District
Court, the main focus was on interpretation of Article 3 of the Hague
Convention of 1907.21） The legal issues were boiled down to the question of
an individual personʼs right to claim compensation under international law.
The decisions denied the claims of the plaintiffs based upon a lack of
grounds for compensation, which was the pattern the Japanese courts had
maintained in 1963. The British case was, like the Dutch case, dismissed in
November 1998. Both cases went to appeal.
Among recent cases addressing relevant issues, only the decision on the
Dutch POW case acknowledged the existence of cruel and inhuman
treatment of prisoners and detainees by the Japanese during the war by
stating that each of the various damages and injuries asserted by the
respective plaintiffs was true. In other words, the court recognized the
damages and injuries and indicated their illegality under international law
while at the same time denying the claims by the plaintiffs, following the
pattern of the decision in the so-called6Atomic Bomb Case (Shimoda
Case, 1963)7.22）
Arguing that there was no rule of customary international law that
grants a right of individual persons to claim compensation, the Japanese
government was developing a specific policy towards to the6Far Eastern
POWs7issue by the mid-1990s. To promote reconciliation, Tokyo sent to
St. James Palace several senior diplomats with sensibilities about the
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6strong feelings7held against Japan by British ex-POWs.
For the Japanese diplomats who would be paving a path for
reconciliation with British ex-POWs, what was most fortune was that they
could expect some advice and even voluntary cooperation from private
sources. It was already in 1984 when the private veterans exchange visit
was organized between the Burma Campaign Fellowship Group, London,
and some volunteers of the All Japan Burma Veterans Association, Tokyo.
The Japanese ex-soldiers sensed that their former enemies6never quite
forgave7their government as well6for not acknowledging VJ day in the
way in which they acknowledged VE day.723） They tried to demonstrate
their6welcome7towards the British, who some felt had6animosity to
Japan was hinted at on their faces.724） Yoshino Shûichirô, the Vice
Chairman of the AJBVA, related that in 1989 approximately 1, 000
Japanese Burma veterans participated in the Tokyo reception to welcome
11 British visitors to Japan. According to Yoshino, inside the reception hall,
an enormous handclap appreciated the British guests, who were
immediately besieged by all the Japanese attendants.6Then I realised how
our royal families feel when they are coming out among the public,7
reflected one of the British visitors when he later made a report on his
pilgrimage to Japan.25）
Hirakubo Masao, Counsellor of the BCFG, often flies back to Japan and
invites his Japanese comrades, Japanese Burma campaign survivors to
reconciliation activities. He explained that the Japanese who attended joint
services in former battlefields and elsewhere, felt like the war dead were
6pleased7with their reconciliation activities. Through joint pilgrimages,
both British veterans and the Japanese felt that they had been were
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released from6survival guilt.7
Although they did not concern themselves with POW issues, those
Anglo-Japanese veteransRmovements for reconciliation made a crucial
impact on Japanese diplomats who were anxious to atone for what the
former British POWs and civilian internees had suffered during the war,
within the limits acceptable to the Japanese public at home. The Foreign
Ministry also support visit to Japan by ex-POWs lead by Keiko Holmes of
AGAPE.26） As the Tokyo spokesman confessed at a press conference in
April 1998, the embassy of Japan in London spent6a considerable amount
of time…working on the general issue of reconciliation…in the context of
what took place during wartime.7The Japanese were anxious to meet
each British ex-prisoner, face to face, and Fujii Hiroaki, Japanese
Ambassador in 1994-1997 and his successor, Hayashi Sadayuki, went to the
extent of asking for forgiveness from the British POWs who allowed the
Japanese to do so. Meetings for6reunion7with ex-British POWs continue
to be organized at regular intervals at the embassy. More than a hundred
British ex-prisoners and their relatives, including the association leaders of
the compensation claimants, gathered at the Japanese embassy for the
farewell party for Numata Sadaaki, then Plenipotentiary Minister when he
returned Tokyo in early 1998.
Still, their efforts for reconciliation were unrelated to Japan as a whole.
The failure to establish a private foundation financed by Japanese
companies seemed to be evidence of a lack of concern by ordinary Japanese
about the British ex-POW issue. A possible project was initially discussed
between the British and Japanese Prime Ministers, John Major and
Hosokawa Morihiro, in September 1993 when the former visited Japan.
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Major informed Hosokawa that he was examining whether non-govern-
mental measures would assist in solving the problem and, based on the
latterʼs agreement, Sir Kit McMahon, former deputy governor of the Bank
of England, was appointed chairman of a committee to develop a possible
project to establish a foundation which might provide practical help to
British ex-POWs. However, when McMahon visited Tokyo in November
1994 to test reactions, what became clear was that the Japanese private
sector was uniformly negative to the project the British government had
proposed. McMahon could only conclude that this kind of approach was
unlikely to succeed.
4. The VJ Day to Emperor Akihito¡s visit to Britain
Voices demanding an apology and compensation of the Japanese were
getting more vigorous in 1995, the fiftieth anniversary of the victory over
Japan, and public opinion in Britain seemed to be severely critical of Japan
and her nationals in this regard. In London, Japanese younger travelers
were delighted with the fireworks shot off to celebrate the victory over
Japan a half century ago; some Japanese living in Britain even found
themselves obliged to guard their self-control in public. Toshiko Marks, an
author living in London, expressed her appreciation to a group of the
Anglo-Japanese veterans from BCFG for the6one and only ceremony for
reconciliation7they hosted at Westminster Abbey while expressing her
anger over the VJ Day celebrations:
Over twenty-five years since I started my life in Britain, I have never
felt before such displeasure. I had to complain to one of my British
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friends on the phone that it looked as if I lived in enemy country. Then,
on 18 August, a postcard came from her saying,6Take heart.The war
will end soon…On 20 August 1995, the war ended. Britain defeated
Japan.727）
The author warned that6easy apologies7by the Japanese government
had rather worsened the whole situation in Britain.
On VJ Day 1995, Murayama Tomiichi, then Prime Minister, issued a
statement expressing deep remorse and apology to the victims of the
Japanese, including the former POWs of the Western Allies. As part of an
effort to6face up to the facts of history,7he had already announced in
1994 a ten-year, 650-million-pound reconciliation program,6The Peace,
and Friendship Initiative7designed mainly for Asian neighbors, including
exchange visits, historical research and scholarships to Japanese schools
for grandchild. The main focus of the initiative was Asian neighbors, but
the Western Allies were also invited to take part, and 800 thousand pounds
were further offered for Britain later, in 1998. Sir Alastair Goodlad, a
government minister, emphasized just after the fiftieth anniversary of VE
Day that the initiative should not be dismissed because it6provides
evidence that the Japanese Government are sensitive to the need…and to
respond to the concerns7strongly felt in the country.28）
It was after the fiftieth anniversary of the war that the British
government came out with a policy of encouraging6all initiatives which
promote reconciliation and recognize the sacrifices made by former
prisoners of war7.29） Tokyo reminded the British that the war criminals
had already been executed or punished by the war crimes courts after the
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war, and expressed6a strong desire to promote reconciliation with former
prisoners of war,7but reiterated that the government was not prepared to
reopen the peace treaty. In early 1998, Hashimoto Ryûtarô, then Prime
Minister, contributed a statement including apology to The Sun. The
tabloid paper commented that Hashimotoʼs statement had6the official
backing of the Japanese government,7unlike the statement by Murayama
in 1995.
In May of that year, Emperor Akihitoʼs state visit to Britain took place.
The state visit should have been the highlight of the achievement of
Anglo-Japanese reconciliation made by the governments as well as those
privately involved in reconciliation over the last decades. By then, the
reconciliation initiatives offered by Tokyo had won some British Burma
veterans to friendship with6yesterdayʼs enemy.7The veterans associa-
tions, such as the Royal British Legion, the Burma Star Association and the
Far Eastern POWs Association, had clarified by then that they would not
seek compensation, nor go to make protests against the Queenʼs guests, at
the Emperorʼs state visit. Among them, the Royal British Legion
specifically showed their concern for the reconciliation initiatives that
Hashimoto offered, and Hashimotoʼs apology, which was published in The
Sun, was welcomed by Blair as6a sign of a blossoming friendship between
Britain and its former enemy.7By the time of the state visit in May 1998,
the Legion had accepted a role in promoting reconciliation initiatives,
taking over the sorts of achievements developed by the BCFG and the
AJBVA in March 1998 when Graham Dawning, National Chairman of the
RBL, made a visit to Japan with other Legion members.
Others refused the6reconciliation package7as a6pathetic insult.7
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Blair stated to ex-prisoners of the Japanese that they had the right to
demonstrate their protest against the Emperor in a6dignified way7and
reminded them of the huge economic links between Japan and Britain.
Hundreds of ex-prisoners and their relatives turned their backs in protest
to the parade welcoming the Emperor. A British former POW burnt the
Japanese national flag in protest during the Emperorʼs tour through
London.30）
Japanese mass media reported in a relatively quiet tone what happened
in London during the Emperorʼs visit. Some Japanese intellectuals argued
that the Japanese government should rather give priority to winning over
Asian neighbors to friendship and mutual trust with Japan and that the
current Anglo-Japanese reconciliation movement completely lacked such
an6Asian viewpoint.731）
Recent Development and Conclusion
The British government is currently considering payment of a special
gratuity for ex-POWs of the Japanese and their widows, something which
has been debated in the House of Commons since March 2000. This
initiative was initially suggested by a British Burma veteran, Philip Malins,
who is a member of the Royal British Legion, the Dunkirk Veterans
Association and the Burma Campaign Fellowship Group. In the Second
World War, Malins fought against the Germans and then against the
Japanese, and in 1945 in French Indo China he commanded Gurkha and
Japanese infantry saving the lives of local people, and survived many
ambushes. Malins explained what had motivated him to devote himself to
Anglo-Japanese reconciliation as follows:
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He remembers with great sadness every race who died and suffered in
war, and particularly the 22 Japanese soldiers killed in an ambush
when he gave the order to open fire on them. He recalls them as young
men like him, in no way responsible for the war, who fought bravely to
the death.32）
In late 1998, he brought together the compensation claimant associations
and the Royal British Legion to campaign for a special gratuity from the
government. Several months before that, in January that year, it was
reported that the British government had rejected a close examination of
the possibility of further compensation, at a higher rate than had actually
been paid in the 1950s as a result of Article 16 of the 1951 peace treaty.33）
What was disclosed then was that Lord Reading had agreed on 26 May
1955 that the British government should not take advantage of Article 26 of
the San Francisco Treaty, which provided for further claims if Japan
concluded agreements with other countries more advantageous than to the
original signatory countries. His footnote said6we are at present
unpopular enough with the Japanese without trying to exert further
pressure which would be likely to cause the maximum resentment for the
minimum advantage734）
According to the6Background Briefing7, which was mainly drafted by
Malins himself, the Royal British Legion was invited by the FEPOWs
Associations in January 1999, to co-ordinate a request for a special
ex-gratia payment from the British government in recognition of the
hardship and suffering they experienced at the hands of the Japanese.35）
The document describes some particular features of a half the sufferings
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the victims had experienced for three and a half years during the war and
also for a half a century since their captivity. FEPOW deaths as a
percentage of FEPOWs captured were the highest rate of all the battle
fronts involving British troops, including the Normandy Landings and the
Burma Campaign, in all of which casualties in total were far below the 25 %
rate of FEPOWs who died or were killed in captivity.36） After the war, they
always suffered trauma:
…with constant threat of death, disease, beatings, torture, starva-
tion, seeing their comrades die around them, and taking part in
burying them. Many never settled down after liberation and suicides
occurred. It is doubtful that any other major group of our citizens in
this century has suffered such trauma…Their demobilisation entitle-
ments at the end of the war were based on rank when captured and
length of service. A private, for example, might have become a
sergeant or been commissioned…under normal circumstances in
three and a half years with enhanced entitlements appropriate to rank.
Under this system a man who never left British soil or heard a shot or
bomb dropped would more than likely have received a higher
demobilisation gratuity. For many years FEPOWs and their widows
struggled to obtain benefits and had to bring up their young families on
inadequate pensions, compounded with bitterness at the attitude of
successive governments. Great effort had to be expended in wringing
pensions and other benefits for FEPOWs from reluctant
Governments.737）
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The campaign thus suggests that the special gratuity should be 10,000
pounds for each ex-POW of the Japanese and widow6in gratitude for all
they suffered in captivity on behalf of their country.7There is no
precedent for such a payment for the government; but the Isle of Man
government has paid that amount to each of their 23 POWs of the Japanese
and civilian internees.
This can be seen as one of the most meaningful, grass-root achievements
of domestic reconciliation between the6forgotten7ones and their
government. Many of them felt an intense sense of injustice and
abandonment by previous governments of both countries. Jack Chalker,
ex-POW of the Japanese and an excellent artist, who secretly recorded life
in the camps, comments that neither the government nor the army has
learnt a sufficient lesson from their experiences:
It remains a constant irritant to many ex-POWs that British
Governments postwar, consistently, and perhaps deliberately, avoided
any open enquiry or Royal Commission to investigate the gross
military and civil complacency and negligence on the part of British
Command in Malaya which led to its fall and that of Singapore. It also
lead to the greatest and most ignominious defeat in Britain history and
a period of unrelieved horror for the Chinese and Malay civilian
population for the following four years. Vital facts have been blandly
smothered in a mass of technical detail in official British war histories
over the early post-war years. 38）
The British initiative of a special gratuity may inspire the Japanese
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government to explore a further stage of international reconciliation. A
specific feature of Japanʼs reconciliation policy towards Britain has been
that late- coming compensation claimants against them should equally be
dealt with under the terms of the total amnesty that the Japanese felt had
been given to the Western former enemy nations during the peace treaty
negotiations of 1951. In one sense, the British initiative can be seen as
resonant with Tokyoʼs reconciliation diplomacy, even if the payment could
result in a feeling that the Japanese being unprepared to entertain any
suggestion of such a payment, from public or private sources, left the onus
entirely on the British government. Arguably, it is possible for the Japanese
government to strengthen the Murayama initiative, establishing an
Anglo-Japanese joint reconciliation commission would be an alternative.
Note This paper is originally presented at The Tampere Conference, The
International Peace Association, Finland, 2000/
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